|
|
|
This last downside threatens to be the most severe of four phenomena, for as James Hill has pointed out (2004, p. The issue about sensation threatens the corpuscular hypothesis’ promise of decreasing secondary, tertiary, and macrolevel main qualities to microlevel primary qualities. The issue for atomist variations of the corpuscular speculation is that the restricted set of properties that they allow the particles -size, shape, and movement-offers no obvious sources for explaining how the particles cohere with one another to form compound bodies. It is thus more basic than the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, which belongs to a particular physical principle, the corpuscular speculation. To be value its salt, a bodily concept should meet the metaphysical constraint supplied by the real-nominal essence distinction. Locke explains his metaphysical distinction using one bodily theory, the corpuscular speculation, as an illustration, and he typically seems to just accept or even defend that speculation. Another technique to absolve Locke of inconsistency is to emphasize his agnosticism or skepticism, while downplaying or reinterpreting passages that appear to commit him to the corpuscular hypothesis. |
|
發表於